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 ABSTRACT:  It is sometimes claimed that conciliatory views on disagreement ulti-
mately lead to either global or widespread scepticism. This is deemed to be a real 
problem for conciliationism either because scepticism of either kind is patently unten-
able or because it poses a serious threat to our intellectual and social lives. In this 
paper, I fi rst argue that the alleged untenability of both types of scepticism is far from 
obvious and should therefore be established rather than taken for granted. Then, I show 
that those who reject both types of scepticism because of the threat they pose surpris-
ingly confuse pragmatic reasons with epistemic reasons. 
 RÉSUMÉ :  On dit parfois que les positions conciliationistes sur le désaccord abou-
tissent à un scepticisme soit global soit étendu. Ceci est considéré comme un réel pro-
blème pour le conciliationisme, soit parce que ces deux types de scepticisme sont 
manifestement insoutenables, soit parce qu’ils constituent une menace sérieuse pour 
nos vies intellectuelle et sociale. Dans cet article, je montre d’abord que le caractère 
prétendument insoutenable de ces deux types de scepticisme est loin d’être évident et 
devrait donc être démontré au lieu d’être simplement présupposé. Je montre ensuite que 
ceux qui rejettent ces deux types de scepticisme à cause de la menace qu’ils repré-
sentent confondent de manière étonnante raisons pragmatiques et raisons épistémiques. 
 1.  Introduction 
 There are at present lively and fertile debates about the epistemic signifi -
cance of disagreement, particularly of disagreement between so-called epi-
stemic peers. My interest in these debates concerns the connection between 
peer disagreement and scepticism in its agnostic or Pyrrhonian variety, namely, 
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 1  Hereafter, whenever I talk of ‘peer disagreement’ or ‘peer dispute,’ I mean peer 
disagreements or disputes that are  recognized or  acknowledged as such by the rival 
parties. 
whether suspension of judgment is the attitude we are compelled (psychologi-
cally or rationally) to adopt in the face of acknowledged peer disputes.  1  In this 
paper, I focus on the objection sometimes raised to conciliationism according 
to which this view ultimately results in either total or widespread suspension 
of judgment. This is considered to be a real problem for conciliatory views 
on peer disagreement either because radical scepticism is a patently absurd 
or untenable stance or because it represents a serious threat to our intellectual 
and social lives. I will fi rst argue that the alleged absurdity or untenability of 
radical scepticism is far from evident and should therefore be established rather 
than taken for granted (Section 2). I will then show that those who reject radical 
scepticism because of the threat it poses surprisingly confuse pragmatic reasons 
with epistemic reasons (Section 3). I will fi nally summarize my stance and 
consider some objections that might be levelled against it (Section 4). 
 Before proceeding, three remarks are in order. First, the reason I talk of 
global  or widespread scepticism is that, while most of the authors whose views 
will be discussed explicitly refer to ‘total,’ ‘wholesale,’ or ‘across-the-board’ 
scepticism, others have in mind a more restricted sceptical stance that recom-
mends suspension of judgment on a wide range of controversial issues. The 
important point for the purposes of this paper is that both kinds of scepticism 
are deemed by all these authors to be untenable or threatening. 
 Second, it might be argued that I should focus on conciliatory views on dis-
agreement in general rather than on peer disagreement in particular because, 
for instance, the notion of epistemic peer is only applicable in the case of 
abstract or idealized disputes, but not in the case of actual or real-life disputes. 
The reason I will here focus mainly on conciliatory views on peer dispute 
is that the majority of the authors whose positions will be considered either 
examine whether those views in particular lead to wholesale or widespread 
scepticism, or refer to these forms of scepticism in the context of their analysis 
of peer disagreement. But for my present purposes nothing important hangs on 
whether the focus is on conciliatory views on peer dispute in particular or on 
conciliatory views that demand more generally that we suspend judgment in 
the face of the kind of entrenched and extensive controversies found in such 
areas as philosophy, religion, ethics, economics, and politics. 
 Third, my aim in this paper is not to argue that there is a sound peer-
disagreement-based argument for global or widespread scepticism. Whether 
there is such an argument depends, among other things, on the defi nition and the 
scope of application of the notion of epistemic peer. In any case, as we will 
see below, some authors do think that it is at least in principle possible to 
construct such a sceptical argument. My aim is to call attention to what I take 
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 2  Conciliatory views are defended by, e.g., Feldman ( 2006 ,  2007 ,  2009 ), Christensen 
( 2007 ,  2011 ), Elga ( 2007 ), and Matheson ( 2009 ). Non-conciliatory views are 
adopted by, e.g., van Inwagen ( 1996 ,  2010 ), Plantinga ( 2000 ), Kelly ( 2005 ,  2010 ), 
and Sosa ( 2010 ). For an overview of the debate between conciliationists and non-
conciliationists, see Machuca ( 2013c : Section 1). 
to be problematic aspects of the way in which scepticism has been treated by 
those authors. The question I consider could be couched in these terms: assuming 
as they do that it is possible to construct such a sceptical argument, have they 
rejected scepticism on adequate grounds? I am well aware that most people 
will disagree that some of the aspects in question are problematic, since most 
people believe that certain forms of scepticism are manifestly absurd or unten-
able or threatening. Still, I think that a dissenting voice is worth hearing. 
 2.  The Untenability of Scepticism 
 Current epistemological discussions of disagreement have focused particularly 
on controversies between epistemic peers, that is, between individuals who are 
roughly equally familiar with the evidence and arguments bearing on the dis-
puted issue and have similar cognitive skills or virtues. Two main views have 
been adopted regarding peer disagreement, namely, conciliationism and stead-
fastness, each comprising a number of variants.  2  To put it in very general 
terms, whereas conciliationists claim that, in the face of a dispute with an epi-
stemic peer, signifi cant belief revision is required, non-conciliationists main-
tain that, in at least many cases, one can retain one’s belief either with the same 
confi dence or with slightly diminished confi dence. Some conciliationists claim 
that the disputants should suspend judgment about the matter at hand, whereas 
others claim that the disputants should split the difference in the degrees of 
confi dence in their respective beliefs. This depends on whether one adopts 
a coarse-grained or a fi ne-grained approach to doxastic attitudes. I will here 
examine the issue mainly in terms of the all-or-nothing model of belief rather 
than the graded model because I am interested in those views that recommend 
suspension of judgment, or at least a signifi cant revision of one’s beliefs, as the 
proper reaction to peer disagreement. 
 An objection often directed against conciliationism is that it leads to either 
global or widespread scepticism. This is deemed to pose two serious problems 
for conciliationists. In this section, I will examine the fi rst problem, while in 
the next, I will look at the second. I will argue that the authors who call atten-
tion to these two problems have not as yet proven that scepticism is not a viable 
option in the face of either peer dispute or extensive persistent philosophical 
disagreement. 
 The fi rst problem allegedly faced by conciliationism is that across-the-board 
scepticism is a patently absurd, incoherent, or implausible stance, and hence 
untenable and unworthy of serious consideration. For instance, David Enoch 
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  3  Roughly put, EWV claims that it is rationally required to give equal weight to the 
opinions of all the parties to a peer dispute when there is no reason for preferring 
one opinion over the others that is independent of the very disagreement between 
the parties. 
  4  Enoch ( 2010 : 954–955). 
  5  Enoch (2010: 991–992). 
  6  Thune ( 2010 : 369). 
  7  Thune (2010: 370). 
  8  Elga (2007: 484–485, 492, 497). 
  9  Elga (2007: 486–488). 
 10  Cf. Kelly (2010: 165–166). 
claims that the form of conciliationism known as the Equal Weight View 
(EWV)  3  entails “highly implausible consequences” that “count heavily against 
it,” the main being the requirement to be epistemically spineless.  4  In his dis-
cussion of the bootstrapping objection levelled against non-conciliationism by 
Adam Elga, he holds that EWV rests in the end on assumptions that naturally 
lead to scepticism, in which case this view “is—even worse than false—quite 
uninteresting.”  5  Given that he does not explain why scepticism is uninteresting, 
I take it that the reason is that it is highly implausible, and given that he does 
not explain why it is highly implausible, I take it that he regards it as obvious 
that it is so. 
 A similar objection to conciliationism has been voiced by Michael Thune, 
who maintains that one of the reasons for rejecting this view is that it “seems 
wrongly to entail a sweeping ‘philosophical skepticism.’”  6  The problem with 
philosophical scepticism is that it is “intuitively false.”  7  Thune remarks that 
it is diffi cult to defend an intuitive claim of this sort, and that all he can say 
is that it just seems correct and highly plausible to him and others. Thus, for 
both Enoch and Thune, the falsity or implausibility of scepticism is so evi-
dent that they are exempt from offering arguments in support of its outright 
rejection. In other words, since scepticism is clearly untenable, there is no 
need of refutation. 
 The problem under consideration is deemed to be so acute that even some of 
the champions of conciliationism feel forced to make it clear that the suspen-
sion of judgment they propose is local, that is, restricted to very specifi c cases 
of disagreement. The clearest example is probably Elga, who maintains that, if 
across-the-board suspension of judgment were entailed by EWV, this would be 
an unwelcome consequence because this view would then lead to absurdity.  8  
I assume it is this low regard for scepticism that mainly explains why, despite 
putting forth the bootstrapping objection as a key reason for not endorsing any 
non-conciliationist stance,  9  Elga makes a move that seems to fall victim to the 
very same objection.  10  He claims that the problem of spinelessness does not 
arise for EWV because, in real-world controversies, when someone disagrees 
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 11  Elga (2007: 492–494). 
 12  Cf. Christensen ( 2009 : 760). 
with one about the question whether  p , he typically disagrees with one about 
many surrounding questions. Even setting aside one’s reasoning about the 
question whether  p , one thinks that one’s opponent is not as likely as one is to 
be right about that question, and hence that he is not one’s peer with respect to 
it. The reason is that, even if he is clever, well informed, and intellectually 
honest, one believes that he is wrong about the closely related questions. And 
if one set aside one’s reasoning about the surrounding issues as well, there 
would be no common ground from which one could appraise one’s dissenter’s 
outlook. As a result, there are few cases of actual peer disagreement, and hence 
few cases in which one is required to suspend judgment.  11  Elga’s move seems 
problematic for the following reason. Let us suppose that my cousin Daniel, 
whom I have hitherto considered to be roughly as intelligent, knowledgeable, 
and intellectually honest as (I think) I am, disagrees with me about the question 
whether  p , and that I realize that this disagreement is due to the fact that we 
disagree about several surrounding matters. It could be argued that, upon 
learning this, the right way to resolve the disagreement in question is not by 
simply assuming that I am the one who holds true beliefs about the related 
disputed issues—thereby taking the surrounding disagreements as evidence 
that Daniel is clearly not my peer about the question whether  p —but by 
resolving the surrounding disagreements. This means that I must fi nd out 
whether Daniel is familiar with the evidence and arguments bearing on the 
associated disputed issues and what his reasons are for holding the beliefs he 
holds. It is not enough that I simply think that Daniel is wrong about the issues 
closely linked to the disputed matter; I must also offer reasons for so thinking. 
Otherwise, it would be too easy for me to dismiss out of hand the views of 
anyone who signifi cantly disagrees with me about a certain number of issues. 
Imagine what this would mean in the case of philosophy, where any controversy 
is closely linked with other controversies, so that it cannot be understood fully 
unless the surrounding controversies are considered. It does not sound  a priori 
plausible to claim that another competent and knowledgeable philosopher with 
whom one is engaged in a dispute about a given matter is not actually one’s 
peer simply because he also considerably disagrees with one about several 
or many closely related matters. In addition, if one considers one’s opponent to 
be in general clever, well informed, and intellectually honest, then it seems that 
one does have reasons for thinking that he might well be right about the ques-
tion whether  p and about at least some of the surrounding questions.  12  Note 
that my contention is not of course that, in the case of interrelated disagree-
ments, one should always treat one’s dissenter as an epistemic equal regarding 
the disputed issues at hand, but only that one should not discard that he is one’s 
peer so easily. As already observed, the main reason for Elga’s questionable 
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 13  Kornblith (2010: 34). 
 14  In personal communication, Kornblith has now confi rmed that my reconstruction 
of his argument is right, since he was indeed taking it for granted that global scep-
ticism is unacceptable. 
move seems to be his desire to avoid at all costs any connection between EWV 
and across-the-board scepticism because the latter is a patently absurd stance. 
 According to Hilary Kornblith ( 2010 ), in the case of most philosophical 
matters as well as in certain perceptual and mathematical cases, peer disagree-
ment gives one reason to suspend judgment entirely. He also claims that merely 
possible disagreement is not as epistemically signifi cant as actual disagree-
ment. The reason is that, if they were equally signifi cant,
 since there might always be people who disagree with one on any question at all, 
treating merely possible disagreement as on a par with actual disagreement would 
result in total skepticism. The worries generated by problems of disagreement, how-
ever, broad as they are, are not of this sort. So there seems to be an important asym-
metry between actual disagreement and merely possible disagreement.  13  
 Kornblith’s argument seems to be the following:
  
 (1)  If actual and merely possible dispute are epistemically on a par, then one 
is required to suspend judgment in the face of merely possible dispute. 
 (2)  If one is required to suspend judgment in the face of merely possible 
dispute, then one is required to endorse global scepticism. 
 (3)  Global scepticism is unacceptable (because it is false, or implausible, 




 (4)  It is not the case that merely possible dispute is epistemically on a par 
with actual dispute. 
  
 Nowhere does Kornblith mention premise (3), but it is the only missing pre-
mise I can think of, unless what he has in mind is a claim about the negative 
pragmatic implications of global scepticism. In that case, my analysis of the 
second problem in the next section would also apply to this argument. But 
given the approach adopted by Kornblith in his paper, it is safe to assume that 
the hidden premise (3) expresses what he has in mind.  14  Thus, what the argu-
ment states is that, since signifi cant belief revision in the case of merely 
possible disagreement, but not in the case of actual disagreement, leads to an 
unacceptable view, then the two types of disagreement are not epistemically 
on a par. That is, whereas the sceptical challenge posed by actual disagreement 
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 15  Another example is David Christensen, who considers whether his approach leads 
to an “objectionable” or “unacceptable” level of scepticism (2007: 189, 213). 
Although he recognizes that his split-the-difference view leads to suspension of 
judgment in many cases, he insists that peer disagreement does not always lead to 
scepticism and that it is unevenly distributed: whereas most mathematical, scien-
tifi c, and everyday beliefs are not subject to signifi cant peer disagreement, many 
moral, religious, political, and philosophical beliefs are (2007: 214). Christensen 
has also sought to provide a version of the principle of independence—on which 
conciliationism rests—that does not lead to “wholesale skepticism,” something he 
regards as a “problem” or “vulnerability” (2009: 760–761; 2011: 15–16). As far 
as I can see, Christensen views any connection between conciliationism and 
wholesale scepticism as problematic because he believes the latter to be patently 
untenable. 
 16  As we will see in the next section, a methodology of this kind is explicitly adopted 
by Sanford Goldberg in his discussion of philosophical disagreement. 
is legitimate and reasonable, the sceptical challenge posed by merely pos-
sible disagreement is unacceptable. The important point for present purposes 
is that Kornblith believes that global scepticism is untenable, and that its 
untenability is so evident that there is no need to offer reasons—or, at least, 
he thinks it is unnecessary to do so in his discussion of the epistemic rele-
vance of disagreement. 
 Many conciliationists manifest a deep concern to avoid wholesale or wide-
ranging scepticism.  15  The reason is that, if their positions entailed global 
or widespread suspension of judgment, this would be a clear proof that there is 
something fundamentally fl awed about them. The cost of bearing any connec-
tion with such forms of scepticism is therefore too high. What many concilia-
tionists and their critics have in common is not only the view that certain 
sceptical stances on peer dispute are untenable, but also the decision not to 
offer any reasons for this view. A possible reason for their disparaging attitude 
towards those stances is that they believe that their falsity, absurdity, or inco-
herence is evident to anyone with properly functioning cognitive faculties. 
Or perhaps they believe that the untenability of such forms of scepticism is 
something that has already been established for good. Or, as a reviewer has 
pointed out, they might think that the methodology of philosophy, as they are 
doing it, presupposes that we can know many of the things about which we are 
theorizing.  16  Given that global or widespread scepticism contradicts this, it is 
ruled out of consideration by that methodology. Perhaps the methodology in 
question is the methodology of common sense, and so our task is to see how 
we can change common sense as little as possible while addressing philosoph-
ical puzzles. Given that global or widespread scepticism implies that all or most 
of common sense is wrong or unjustifi ed, it is a non-starter. If this is what 
explains the attitude of (some of) those who in the disagreement literature 
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 17  With regard to global suspension of judgment, another possible reason it is rejected 
is that such a stance would in the end be self-defeating or self-undermining: when 
the global sceptic fi nds out that most people believe that we should not suspend 
judgment in the face of most fi rst-order disagreements, he should suspend judgment 
about whether he should suspend judgment. This charge, which I call the ‘disagree-
ing about disagreement argument,’ has now started to be discussed in detail in the 
literature on peer disagreement. I do not have the space to address it here, but in 
Machuca (Unpublished) I consider the charge, examine some conciliationist replies 
to it, and explain how a Pyrrhonian sceptic would respond to it. 
 18  See especially Greco ( 2000 ). It is perhaps worth noting that a similar methodolog-
ical use of sceptical arguments was made by medieval philosophers: see Grellard 
( 2004 : 128–129;  2007 : 342) and especially Perler ( 2010 ). 
dismiss global or widespread scepticism out of hand, the sceptic could make 
three remarks. First, they should at the very least make explicit what method-
ology they are following. Second, there is among non-sceptics entrenched dis-
agreement about the correct methodology for philosophical inquiry, which is 
grist for the sceptical mill. Third, judging by the contemporary epistemological 
debate about common sense and scepticism, it is far from clear that appeal to 
common sense is a legitimate or effective defence against scepticism.  17  
 Far from being exclusive to those working in the epistemology of disagree-
ment, the opinion that scepticism is untenable is prevalent in the philosoph-
ical milieu. Now, when faced with the view that his stance is evidently false, 
absurd, or incoherent, the sceptic would argue that across-the-board or wide-
spread suspension is perhaps an indefensible outlook, but that this is something 
that must be proven rather than taken for granted. Indeed, it seems that we 
should fi nd such a dismissive view on scepticism much more surprising than 
we in fact do, if we simply attended to the part that scepticism has played in the 
history of philosophy. For, if it is so evidently false or absurd or incoherent, 
why have so many important historical fi gures undertaken its thoughtful refu-
tation? Likewise, why are so many philosophers still deeply concerned with 
the problem of scepticism in different fi elds of philosophic inquiry? The 
answer seems to be that, as a philosophical stance, scepticism is worth exam-
ining and in need of refutation. 
 Someone might object that this is not the right answer, since most philoso-
phers, especially contemporary analytic epistemologists, make a merely meth-
odological use of sceptical arguments. They assume that the conclusions of 
these arguments are false, but claim that engaging sceptical arguments and 
determining where they go wrong can help us construct an accurate account of 
the nature of knowledge and evidence.  18  Three remarks are in order. First, not 
all epistemologists (I know at least a couple) make a merely methodological 
use of sceptical arguments, and even if this were the unanimous practice in 
epistemology, in areas like metaethics and philosophy of religion those who 
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 19  Sosa (2010: 283–284). 
discuss sceptical arguments view these arguments as posing serious challenges 
to the epistemic justifi cation of our moral and religious beliefs. Second, one 
could take both the diffi culties in pinpointing where sceptical arguments go 
wrong and the disagreement about exactly where they go wrong as an indica-
tion that it is probably too naïve or conceited or dogmatic to just take for 
granted that scepticism is false. Third, can we honestly affi rm that philosophic 
inquiry in, e.g., epistemology, metaethics, and philosophy of religion has already 
offered knock-down arguments against all forms of radical scepticism so that 
we can simply take its incorrectness as established in our current investigations 
in each of those areas? In the specifi c case of the present epistemological dis-
cussions of disagreement, one observes that some well-respected philosophers 
are at a loss to explain why they are entitled to retain their beliefs, instead of 
suspending judgment, in the face of disagreements with people over whom 
they cannot discern any epistemic advantage. As we will see in the next section, 
one of the ways out they have found consists in appealing to some mysterious 
insight that they enjoy but that is unfortunately denied to their rivals. 
 My point in this section has been to emphasize that, in general, the parties to 
the current debate about peer disagreement have illegitimately dismissed out 
of hand the sceptical alternative. Even though in philosophical discussions one 
may be entitled to set aside certain issues, in the present case this means that 
the debate is greatly simplifi ed and impoverished because of scepticism’s inti-
mate connection to the question of the epistemic relevance of disagreement in 
general. Once again, any disparaging or dismissive view on scepticism 
seems unfair, not because one denies the possibility of establishing that 
global or widespread suspension of judgment is in the end incoherent, absurd, 
or indefensible, but precisely because this is something that needs to be 
established rather than assumed. 
 3.  The Damaging Effects of Scepticism 
 The second problem faced by any view that results in either global or wide-
spread scepticism is that these forms of scepticism allegedly have damaging 
effects on both our philosophical worldviews and our everyday lives. This 
causes a strong fear of scepticism among both philosophers and laypersons, 
a fear detectable among those who discuss the epistemic signifi cance of peer 
disagreement. For instance, with regard to EWV, Ernest Sosa observes:
 But fi rst we consider its implications for avoiding a dispiriting ‘spinelessness’ when-
ever we disagree with apparent peers. The importance of this issue is shown by how 
broadly it would bear on questions that matter to us in politics, religion, philosophy, 
and other such domains. It would be bad to have to suspend judgment on just about 
any controversial issue.  19  
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 21  Cf. van Inwagen (2010: 28). 
 So wide-ranging suspension of judgment must be avoided because being epi-
stemically spineless is  bad , a straightforward claim that conveys a commonly 
shared view about the threat posed by widespread scepticism. The same feeling 
of deep uneasiness towards scepticism is expressed by Peter van Inwagen. 
After reporting that David Lewis strongly disagreed with him regarding his 
beliefs that free will is incompatible with determinism and that unrealized pos-
sibilities are not physical objects, he points out:
 I  do believe these things. And I believe that I am justifi ed in believing them. And 
I am confi dent that I am right. But how can I take these positions? I don’t know. … 
I suppose my best guess is that I enjoy some sort of philosophical insight … that, for 
all his merits, is somehow denied to Lewis. And this would have to be an insight that 
is incommunicable … for I have done all I can to communicate it to Lewis, and he 
has understood perfectly everything I have said, and he has not come to share my 
conclusions. But maybe my best guess is wrong. I’m confi dent about only one thing 
in this area: the question must have some good answer. For not only do my beliefs 
about these questions seem to me to be undeniably  true , but … I don’t want to be 
forced into a position in which I can’t see my way clear to accepting any philosoph-
ical thesis of any consequence. Let us call this unattractive position philosophical 
skepticism. … I think that any philosopher who does not wish to be a philosophical 
skeptic … must agree with me that this question has some good answer: whatever the 
reason, it must be possible for one to be justifi ed in accepting a philosophical thesis 
when there are philosophers who, by all objective and external criteria, are at least 
equally well qualifi ed to pronounce on that thesis and who reject it.  20  
 The two explanations that van Inwagen offers for why he confi dently holds 
certain beliefs even in the face of entrenched peer disagreement are actually 
intimately related. For it is his fear of scepticism that explains why, even when 
experiencing puzzlement as to the reason for his upholding views that he 
knows are rejected by equally clever and well-trained philosophers, he prefers 
to postulate some sort of philosophical insight that he is lucky to possess but 
that he cannot communicate to his opponents. In his eyes, there is no question 
that hypothesizing this philosophical insight is preferable to taking a sceptical 
stance. He seems to believe that  anything is better than scepticism. It is his 
aversion to scepticism that renders him immune to the compelling consider-
ations in favour of suspension of judgment in the case of deep-rooted peer 
controversies, even though he is fully conscious of them and recognizes that 
he cannot counter them on epistemic grounds.  21  Precisely because he fi nds 
the mere idea of becoming a sceptic utterly unattractive or repellent, he thinks 
that there must be a conclusive justifying basis for his philosophical beliefs. 
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 22  Goldberg ( 2009 : 105). 
 23  It should be observed that Goldberg (2009: 111) passes without comment from talk-
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 24  Goldberg (2009: 111). 
I will come back to van Inwagen’s move in a moment. For now it is impor-
tant to note that, unlike the authors whose views I examined in the previous 
section, Sosa and van Inwagen reject scepticism, not because they believe it 
is patently false, absurd, or incoherent, but because they believe it has deeply 
negative implications for our intellectual and social lives. 
 A similar unease with scepticism can be detected in Sanford Goldberg’s dis-
cussion of the epistemic justifi cation of philosophical belief in relation to the 
problem of disagreement in philosophy. The reason for considering his view is 
that, as far as I can tell, his arguments should lead him to take a sceptical atti-
tude towards the possibility of justifi ed beliefs about disputed philosophical 
issues, yet he resists this outcome because of his reluctance to accept that all of 
his beliefs on such issues are unwarranted. Goldberg focuses his analysis on 
the following three claims that he views as individually plausible or defensible 
but jointly incompatible:
 (1) Reliability is a necessary condition on epistemic justifi cation; 
 (2) on contested matters in philosophy, my beliefs are not reliably formed; 
 (3)  some of my beliefs on contested matters in philosophy are epistemically justifi ed.  22  
 I will leave aside both the question whether reliabilism is correct as a theory 
about epistemic justifi cation and the question of the soundness of Goldberg’s 
arguments for (2). The reason is that I am specifi cally interested in his reasons 
for holding (3) in the face of entrenched philosophical controversies. In other 
words, given that he endorses reliabilism and thinks that the arguments for 
(2) are sound, why does he continue to endorse (3)? He recognizes that none of 
the considerations he offers in support of this latter proposition—he is reason-
ably intelligent, has professional training in philosophy and experience doing 
philosophy, works hard and is careful in his investigations, has reasons for his 
views and subjects these reasons to both self-scrutiny and the scrutiny of 
others—ensures that his philosophical beliefs are true,  nor that they are reli-
able. However, he maintains that it would be a curious outcome if none of his 
philosophical beliefs were justifi ed,  23  the reason being that,
 where justifi ed belief is possible, we might be forgiven for thinking that it is just such 
a person who will attain it. What sort of activity is philosophy anyway, that it attracts 
reasonably intelligent people into spending their intellectual lives toiling away, only 
to be systematically thwarted in their efforts at justifi ed belief  ?  24  
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 Besides failing to understand how Goldberg can claim that some of his philo-
sophical beliefs are justifi ed, despite recognizing that the considerations in 
favour of this claim do not ensure their reliability, I must confess that I do not 
see why the fact that intelligent (even brilliant) people devote themselves 
to philosophy entails that some of their beliefs about disputed philosophical 
issues are epistemically justifi ed. Is persistent, deep-rooted, widespread dis-
agreement not an undeniable fact about philosophy? Is it not a fact that brilliant 
philosophers deeply disagree with one another on, at the very least, a great 
many issues? Is the common claim that there is no real progress in philosophy 
(except for areas such as logic) arbitrary or capricious? The only strong reason 
I can think of for resisting scepticism about philosophy is that its effects are 
appalling, and Goldberg seems to be motivated by such a reason when at the 
end of his article he claims:
 The odd man out would appear to be (3), but this leaves me—us—in an unhappy 
position … neither you nor I are warranted in making assertions on controversial 
matters of philosophy. This will require either a wholesale reconfi guration of the 
practice of philosophy (don’t assert anything!), or else a recognition that when you 
and I do philosophy … we are systematically behaving in an unwarranted fashion.  25  
 And in a note concerning the option to stop making assertions, he adds:
 Perhaps the ancient skeptics were right after all, at least in practice: we have no busi-
ness claiming philosophical knowledge. Though neither we nor they should actually 
 assert this. Is  this a happy position?  26  
 Goldberg’s reason for not embracing metaphilosophical scepticism is simply 
that he is unwilling to accept the unpleasant and shocking implications of 
the claim that all of his beliefs on controversial philosophical matters are 
unfounded or unwarranted. He is not disposed to admit that philosophical 
inquiry might be pointless insofar as its aim is conceived of as the acquisition 
of knowledge or justifi ed belief, i.e., as the attainment of truth. At times it seems 
that the type of scepticism he has in mind consists in the denial of the possi-
bility of philosophical knowledge or justifi ed philosophical belief or the possi-
bility of discovering truth. Of course, this philosophical view is self-defeating 
or self-undermining if it asserts that we are unjustifi ed in making philosophical 
assertions. There is, however, another variety of scepticism—the Pyrrhonian 
variety—that is the one to which Goldberg alludes in the second quote above. 
The Pyrrhonian sceptic limits himself to reporting that he has so far been unable 
to acquire philosophical knowledge or justifi ed philosophical belief or to attain 
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 27  This is not the place to defend my interpretation of the ancient Pyrrhonist’s stance, 
in particular his outlook on suspension of judgment and rationality. I have done so 
in, e.g., Machuca ( 2011 ) and ( 2013a ). 
 28  It should be noted that Goldberg is now much less reluctant to adopt a sceptical 
stance: see Goldberg ( 2013a ) and ( 2013b ). 
the truth regarding the matters he has investigated. Also, he does not present 
his suspension of judgment as a philosophical view that he believes or asserts 
to be epistemically or rationally grounded. Rather, he observes ( i ) that his own 
suspension of judgment is a state of mind in which, as a matter of fact, he fi nds 
himself when confronted with apparently equipollent arguments, and ( ii ) that 
his rivals’ own theories commit them to suspending judgment.  27  I do not think, 
however, that this form of scepticism would be appealing to Goldberg, just as 
it is clearly unappealing to the great majority of philosophers. In fact, he 
explicitly says that the outlook recommended by the ancient sceptics is not a 
happy position. As already noted, Goldberg resists taking a stance that seems 
to be required by his own arguments. Perhaps he is not to be blamed for his 
reluctance to adopt a sceptical stance, given what is at stake for him, i.e., 
given the value that philosophical inquiry practiced in a non-sceptical manner 
has for him.  28  
 In sum, the reason global or widespread suspension of judgment is to be 
rejected as an unattractive position is that it has negative consequences for 
important areas of our lives. This is a quite common stance on scepticism 
among both philosophers and laypersons, who usually discard either local 
or global forms of scepticism because their implications would be unwelcome 
or disastrous or depressing or unfortunate. It is thought, frequently not in an 
explicit way, that, given these negative implications, scepticism must be false 
or should not be taken into account as a suitable philosophical stance. Indeed, 
quite often we hear or read that atheism and religious agnosticism are to be 
rejected as real alternatives because a world without the divine or a life of 
ignorance about the divine would make our existence pointless or meaningless; 
that moral anti-realism and moral agnosticism are false because otherwise 
everything would be permitted and social order would crumble; that denying 
or suspending judgment about the rational justifi cation of trust is unacceptable 
because it depicts a terrible picture of human relationships; that denying or sus-
pending judgment about the possibility of knowledge or justifi ed belief in 
general is to be rejected because it leaves us in world of total unbearable uncer-
tainty. And hence scepticism is almost always held in an extremely low regard. 
 What the aforementioned reactions against scepticism show is that a consid-
erable number of people have  pragmatic reasons for rejecting or ignoring it. 
For they believe that, if the sceptic’s stance is correct, then it represents a 
hindrance to the attainment of certain goals they take to be crucial to their 
intellectual or social lives. I have no problem with this belief because whether 
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scepticism has negative pragmatic implications or effects is largely a psycho-
logical matter. I mean, whether the realization that, e.g., one cannot determine 
whether there exist objective moral values will lead a person to depression, 
distress, or anarchy will depend on that person’s psychological makeup. The 
majority of people seem to believe that they would undergo strongly unpleasant 
feelings were they to suspend judgment across the board, whereas the second-
century sceptic Sextus Empiricus tells us that the ancient Pyrrhonist unex-
pectedly attained the state of undisturbedness ( ataraxia ) in matters of opinion 
upon suspending judgment about all matters of inquiry.  29  So what I am criti-
cizing is rather that pragmatic reasons are sometimes mistaken for epistemic 
reasons. One must keep in mind that, in seeking to determine which doxastic 
attitude is rationally required in the face of peer dispute or extensive persistent 
disagreement, the parties to the debate are concerned, not with which doxastic 
attitude is pragmatically justifi ed, but with which doxastic attitude is epistemi-
cally supported by the total body of available evidence. Once again, the alleged 
fact that the implications of scepticism are deeply appalling because they 
threaten our intellectual or social lives may constitute a strong pragmatic rea-
son for rejecting it, but other reasons are needed if we want to reject it on epi-
stemic grounds. 
 Keeping the distinction between the two kinds of reasons in mind also allows 
us to see that pragmatic reasons against scepticism are advanced because there 
are at least  prima facie strong epistemic reasons in its favour. Indeed, if scepti-
cism were patently incoherent or false, then our lives would not possess any of 
the depressing characteristics allegedly entailed by it. That is, if scepticism could 
be readily defeated on epistemic grounds, then there would be no reason to worry 
about its negative practical implications. If this is correct, then if one affi rms that 
any view that leads to global or widespread suspension of judgment faces the 
pragmatic problem under consideration, then one cannot maintain that it also 
faces the fi rst problem examined in the previous section, for the simple reason 
that scepticism would not be a patently incoherent or false stance. 
 Most readers will probably fi nd the preceding remarks obvious or elemen-
tary. For it is plainly a  non sequitur to argue that the excruciating practical and 
emotional effects of scepticism entail that it is false or that it ought not to be 
considered as a valid philosophical alternative. However, given the widespread 
use of that line of argument, it is necessary to insist that epistemological dis-
cussions of disagreement must investigate, not whether scepticism has useful 
or benefi cial effects, but whether it is the alternative best supported by the total 
body of available evidence.  30  If scepticism cannot be refuted and if it has any 
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of the aforementioned appalling consequences, so be it. At least those who are 
in the business of philosophy should swallow their fear and follow where the 
arguments lead. 
 It has been pointed out to me that other readers, by contrast, will not fi nd the 
distinction between epistemic and pragmatic reasons obvious at all, since they 
will argue that recent discussions of pragmatic encroachment should make one 
suspicious of the sharp distinction between those two types of reasons. I cannot 
address here the vexed question whether what we ought to believe is in part 
dependent upon practical considerations regarding what we ought to do. Let 
me just point out that, although it is a controversial view on justifi cation, at 
least quite a few of those engaged in the current debate about the epistemic 
signifi cance of disagreement seem to be committed to evidentialism, according 
to which what one ought to believe depends upon one’s total evidence:
 Evidentialism 
 S is epistemically justifi ed in adopting doxastic attitude A towards proposition  p at 
time  t if and only if S’s total body of evidence at  t supports adopting A towards  p .  31  
 In the disagreement literature, the discussion is couched in terms of whether 
both the fi rst-order and the higher-order evidence bearing on the target propo-
sition justify believing, disbelieving, or suspending judgment about that prop-
osition. Or, on a fi ne-grained approach to doxastic attitudes, the relevant 
question is what degree or level of credence in the target proposition is best 
supported by one’s total evidence. Given that at least quite a few epistemolo-
gists working on disagreement follow the traditional, purely ‘intellectualist’ 
picture of epistemic justifi cation, it seems legitimate to criticize them when-
ever they draw epistemic conclusions on the basis of pragmatic reasons. More-
over, even those who endorse pragmatic encroachment do not claim that 
pragmatic reasons are epistemic reasons, but only that the stakes can affect 
how good one’s epistemic reasons need to be. 
 My critical analysis of the second problem allegedly faced by conciliation-
ism may be taken as an instance, within the context of the literature on dis-
agreement, of the dissatisfaction with pragmatic responses to scepticism 
expressed by certain contemporary epistemologists.  32  It should be noted, 
though, that the pragmatic replies in question are two distinct versions of a 
well-known charge already levelled in antiquity against both Pyrrhonian and 
Academic scepticism, namely, the inactivity or  apraxia objection. According to 
the pragmatic response that has been discussed in the epistemology literature—
which is advanced mainly against external world scepticism—either the scep-
tic’s actions are inconsistent with the conclusion of his argument or his actions 
 484  Dialogue
 33  E.g., King ( 2012 ) and ( 2013 ). 
show that he does not actually believe the conclusion. By contrast, the prag-
matic response to scepticism that I have discussed in this section maintains that 
global or widespread scepticism should be rejected because it makes impos-
sible a life that is good, tolerable, or worth living. 
 4.  Concluding Remarks 
 I have argued that those engaged in the current discussions of the epistemic 
signifi cance of disagreement rule out radical scepticism as a serious alternative 
for two reasons. The fi rst is that global or widespread suspension of judgment 
is so patently untenable, absurd, or incoherent that it can simply be ignored. The 
second reason is that the implications of radical scepticism are so appalling, 
worrisome, or hard to digest that one had better avoid it. I have claimed that 
these two reasons are arbitrary and weak. First, even if global or widespread 
suspension of judgment is indefensible, this is not evident, but rather some-
thing that must be established. Otherwise, one could not explain either the 
crucial role scepticism has played in the history of philosophy or the signifi cant 
part it continues to play particularly in epistemology, metaethics, and philos-
ophy of religion. Second, even if scepticism is a real threat to our intellectual 
and social lives, we must be careful to distinguish between epistemic and prag-
matic reasons for rejecting it. For even if it hinders the attainment of (some of) 
our practical and intellectual goals, this by itself does not entail that scepticism 
is epistemically unjustifi ed, but only that it is instrumentally unjustifi ed. 
 Let me make clear where I stand: I do not think that global or widespread 
suspension of judgment is either a ludicrous philosophical outlook that can 
simply be dismissed out of hand or a serious philosophical disease against 
which we must be immunized. Scepticism is a possible outcome of many 
careful and thorough inquiries, and hence any serious inquirer needs to deal 
with it to see if sceptical doubts,  aporias , or challenges can be overcome on 
epistemic grounds. We cannot just sweep it under the carpet because we fi nd it 
threatening. Or we can, but in that case we should at least make it clear that we 
are not refuting it on epistemic grounds. Given that we are in the business of 
philosophy, we should probably follow the arguments where they lead, even if 
this means ending up in a state of total uncertainty. 
 I will conclude by addressing two possible objections. It might fi rst be 
argued that the reason global or widespread scepticism has been dismissed out 
of hand by the authors who focus on peer disagreement is that such scepticism 
is not a conclusion that can plausibly be reached on the basis of peer disagree-
ment. Although this line of argument has been followed by some authors,  33  it 
is not followed by the authors whose views I have considered. These authors, 
some of whom are non-conciliationists and others conciliationists, think that 
conciliatory views on peer dispute either do lead or may lead to either global 
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or widespread scepticism. Whereas the non-conciliationists in question take 
the patently untenable or threatening character of such forms of scepticism as 
a reason for rejecting conciliationism, the conciliationists in question take it as 
a reason for formulating their views in such a way as to not lead to them. 
 It might also be asked whether, even if one grants that global or wide-
spread scepticism has been unduly ignored in the contemporary literature 
on disagreement, anything interesting follows for the current debate. In 
other words, would taking scepticism (more) seriously change the debate in 
a signifi cant way? Why does scepticism matter at all? For one, recognizing 
that certain forms of scepticism have been unduly dismissed out of hand 
requires that those who deny the viability or tenability of global or wide-ranging 
suspension of judgment put forth arguments that establish that it is indeed 
the case that such forms of scepticism are unviable or untenable. Doing so 
would by itself considerably enrich the current debate over the possible 
sceptical implications of disagreement. And if such arguments were found 
unconvincing or implausible or unsound, then all those involved in the debate 
would have to seriously consider whether refl ection on peer dispute or on 
widespread persistent disagreement does lead to suspension of judgment 
about the issues that are subject to these kinds of disagreement. If it did, 
then we would have to admit, albeit reluctantly, that such types of dispute 
provide an undefeated defeater for at least a considerable number of our 
beliefs. 
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